Clock ticking as Hormuz standoff threatens Gulf’s food supply

Food security has become a growing issue for Gulf Cooperation Council states grappling with supply chain disruptions and the accelerating effects of climate change. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has transformed this challenge into an urgent reality. Through this narrow waterway passes the energy that powers the global economy and the food that sustains the populations living along its shores. With GCC countries importing between 70 and 90 percent of their staple foods, the closure of the strait leaves the region’s food security at significant risk.
The scale of disruption since late February has been dramatic. Tanker traffic has collapsed, with only five vessels exiting the Gulf since the end of the month. Under normal circumstances, the strait carries around 20 million barrels of crude oil per day, one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas supplies, and up to 30 percent of internationally traded fertilizers. The simultaneous disruption of these critical commodity flows highlights a crisis that extends beyond energy and shipping; it is fundamentally a food security emergency with a maritime dimension.
Between 40 and 50 percent of global seaborne urea trade originates from the Middle East. Nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur, and all the chemical inputs without which modern agriculture cannot function are produced in abundance in the Gulf and can no longer leave it at scale. Agricultural production follows biological cycles that cannot be postponed. Fields that are under-fertilized this season will not recover their yields in the next. An energy shock quickly becomes a fertilizer shock, which in turn becomes a food crisis. The GCC is experiencing all three at once, and in sequence.
The impact varies across the six member states, but food security has become a shared regional test. Qatar arrived at this crisis better positioned after having already faced a version of it. The 2017 blockade forced Doha to confront its supply chain fragility in real time and at speed. The result was a comprehensive overhaul, 51 climate-controlled silos at Hamad Port with capacity to cover two years of national food demand, and full self-sufficiency in dairy production. Those investments are paying dividends now. Overland corridors via Saudi Arabia under the TIR system — a streamlined global transport network — have been activated, and airfreight has absorbed the gap for perishables, though at a cost, with prices rising 10 to 20 percent. Qatar has food, but is paying more for it. That is a manageable problem for now.
Oman has emerged as the region’s most structurally advantaged country because of geography rather than policy. The ports of Salalah and Duqm face the Arabian Sea directly. No ship calling at either one touches the Strait of Hormuz. When the disruption severed Dubai and Dammam as distribution hubs, India’s food export flows to the Gulf began rerouting through Omani ports, bringing added investment in milling, cold storage, and packaging infrastructure. A crisis accelerated an infrastructure buildout that had been proceeding at a measured pace for years. Oman had the good fortune of facing the right direction when the strait closed. 

The impact varies across the six member states, but food security has become a shared regional test.

Zaid M. Belbagi

Saudi Arabia plays a prominent role in the stability of the region. The Red Sea ports of Jeddah, Yanbu, and Jazan operate entirely independently of Hormuz. The East-West pipeline corridor provides an additional bypass for energy flows. The Kingdom bought around 1.7 million tonnes of wheat in the months before the crisis, a true signal of planning that has converted into genuine insulation, facilitating transit for neighbors whose logistics chains were more exposed.
For the UAE, Jebel Ali handles about 20 million TEUs in cargo capacity annually and sits firmly inside the strait’s shadow. Fujairah and Khor Fakkan offer alternatives, but their combined capacity is around 6 million TEUs, and Fujairah itself sustained damage in early March. The gap between what those ports can absorb and what the UAE’s economy requires cannot be closed by rerouting alone.
Financial strength provides a buffer unavailable to almost any other import-dependent region in the world. Gulf governments can buy food on spot markets and subsidize imports at scale. This capacity has prevented the shortages seen elsewhere from developing into crises at home. However, if the disruption persists for several more months, the Food and Agriculture Organization warns that risks could escalate significantly, affecting global planting decisions for 2026 and beyond. Strategic reserves covering four to six months may appear reassuring, but questions inevitably arise about replenishment. Global fuel prices have more than doubled compared with 2025 levels, and every shipment that arrives carries those costs through to consumer prices.
This crisis has confirmed the region’s enduring structural vulnerability. A single maritime chokepoint remains the conduit for a significant share of its food imports, exposing even the wealthiest states to external shocks. The solution lies in investing in integrated overland logistics corridors, coordinated strategic reserve policies, accelerated domestic production, and multimodal freight infrastructure that can route around Hormuz rather than through it. Together, these measures form the foundation of a genuinely resilient food security system.
Whether this moment becomes a turning point will depend on the region’s ability to translate urgency into long-term action. Doing so will require the kind of sustained multilateral cooperation that the GCC has often struggled to maintain beyond periods of acute crisis. For countries that long ago stopped feeding themselves, food security is the most important consideration amid the current crisis.

• Zaid M. Belbagi is a political commentator and an adviser to private clients between London and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
X: @Moulay_Zaid