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Against its wishes, the entire Middle East has become embroiled in the US-Israeli-Iranian triangle of conflict. Since a ceasefire was agreed at the beginning of April, the region has been left with little certainty as to whether this fragile truce will lead to a long-term solution or, should negotiations fail, to a resumption of the war, possibly with even greater intensity. Meanwhile, the facade of a united US-Israeli front regarding Iran and its proxies has begun to show widening cracks. An explosive telephone conversation between US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last week illustrated these growing divisions.
There appeared to be a clear interest from at least some quarters of the Trump administration in ensuring that details of the conversation reached the public domain, including the unpleasant expletives reportedly used by the American president. Trump allegedly suggested that, were it not for him, Netanyahu would already be in prison, telling the Israeli leader: “Everybody hates you now. Everybody hates Israel because of this.”
This was hardly subtle, nor what one would normally expect from a diplomatic exchange between allies. Nevertheless, it conveyed a clear message: A war that had begun with relative harmony between the two leaders has now exposed a significant rift between the two allies, as their priorities and objectives increasingly diverge. Trump’s frustration appears to stem from his focus on ending the war and desire to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of which which is hurting the US and its allies’ economies, while also seeking to resolve the nuclear issue. Netanyahu, by contrast, appears to have a much broader agenda, including continued military pressure on Iran and Hezbollah and, potentially, regime change in Tehran.
The immediate trigger for Trump’s anger was Netanyahu’s threats, echoed by other members of his government, to escalate military operations in Lebanon, including suggestions of flattening parts of Beirut that serve as Hezbollah strongholds. This came at a time when Tehran was insisting that any agreement to end the broader conflict must be linked to ending hostilities in Lebanon, while Israel maintained that military operations would continue until Hezbollah was disarmed.
What this angry exchange demonstrated is that it is ultimately only the US, and particularly Trump, who can restrain Netanyahu. Immediately after the conversation, Netanyahu reportedly ordered an immediate halt to the bombardment of Beirut.
The Israeli leader can largely blame himself for reaching this low point in relations with both Washington and Trump personally, relationships that are arguably more important to Israel than they are to the US. This development carries both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, Washington appears increasingly aware that it should not simply follow Netanyahu’s lead in shaping Middle East policy, particularly if that would involve becoming entangled in a prolonged regional war. In a region as complex as the Middle East, sustainable conflict resolution requires engaging with that complexity rather than selectively addressing issues while assuming that the opposing side will eventually capitulate.
Netanyahu can blame himself for reaching this low point.
Yossi Mekelberg
Nevertheless, a widening rift between Washington and Israel at such a critical moment may also embolden Tehran’s negotiating stance, a concern for many countries across the region. The decision to go to war without a clear endgame, based on the assumption that the Iranian regime would collapse within days or weeks under combined domestic and external pressure and be replaced by a pro-Western government, was unrealistic from the outset. Worse still, the conflict has created a new set of realities that cannot simply be ignored, and that may not necessarily favor those who initiated the war.
Iran’s response to the conflict, of drone and missile attacks against neighboring countries’ strategic targets, causing many civilian casualties and the disruption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, has completely broken trust in the regime in Tehran. These states were neither party to the decision to go to war nor active participants in it. Yet they have suffered economic and security consequences. This reality underscores the need for a united regional front — particularly among Gulf states — which establishes clear red lines for resolving the conflict.
Tehran’s claim that its nuclear program is solely for civilian purposes is increasingly difficult to sustain when it possesses hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Any future agreement must therefore address the removal of such stockpiles, establish strict limits on uranium enrichment, and include robust inspection mechanisms, potentially accompanied by economic incentives. Equally important is restoring the pre-war arrangements governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. There should be no tariffs, restrictions, or suggestions that Iran exercise unilateral control over this key waterway. Under international law, states do not possess the right to “close” waterways.
The Iranian regime will likely remain intact. However, this should not imply acceptance of policies that seek to destabilize neighboring countries by providing weapons, funding, and political support to allied groups. At the same time, Israel must recognize that much of the region strongly opposes Netanyahu’s increasingly hard-line, risk-prone, and often counterproductive approach to managing regional conflicts. In the months leading up to Israel’s general election later this year, the current government will likely seek to demonstrate to voters that it can “finish the job” by eliminating Hamas, neutralizing Hezbollah, degrading the Iranian military and nuclear capabilities, and perhaps even facilitating regime change in Tehran, all primarily through military means.
Yet more than two and a half years of this approach, pursued without a coherent long-term aim, have done little to enhance Israel’s security. If anything, this strategy may have undermined it, resulting in devastating consequences across the wider region. Israel’s legitimate security concerns have increasingly been translated into demonstrations of military power, supported by the US, but without a credible political or diplomatic horizon. The result could be years of further security, economic, and diplomatic turmoil that would only strengthen the most radical forces on all sides.
Hence, what is required now is the mobilization of a regional coalition capable of restoring rationality to the security and diplomatic discourse, if possible supported by the like-minded in the international community. Such a coalition should insist on the prevention of nuclear proliferation for military purposes, maintaining freedom of navigation through all regional waterways, supporting the Lebanese government in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 170, including the full withdrawal of Israeli forces to agreed international borders, and moving with urgency toward ending the war in Gaza. It should also work toward meaningful peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians with the objective of implementing a viable two-state solution.
The era of leaving the regional arena to the most extreme actors has produced one calamity after another, bringing the Middle East to one of the most consequential crossroads in its modern history. What is needed now is for the voices of moderation, sustainable development, and diplomacy to be heard loudly and clearly, marginalizing extremists and fundamentalists alike, and helping the region avoid yet another, and potentially even greater, calamity.
• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.
X: @YMekelberg
