BRICS+ group’s growing geopolitical gaps

The countdown is underway for the G7 summit of industrialized democracies in France in June. However, another big event in September — the BRICS+ leadership meetings — is attracting at least as much global attention.
For the first time in years, all the major BRICS+ leaders, including Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, are expected to attend the summit. This is important for the club given the significant challenges it is facing.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as the 2026 chair of the forum, is walking a tightrope to prevent intragroup geopolitical gaps widening. For the first time since the 2009 founding of the bloc, one member, Iran, has used military force against other members.
The BRICS+ meeting of deputy foreign ministers and special envoys in New Delhi in late April ended without a joint declaration, with the chair of the meeting forced to issue a face-saving statement instead.
This backdrop has intensified a core challenge for BRICS+. The bloc was originally founded around the economics of four key emerging market nations — Brazil, Russia, India, and China — which alone encompass more than 20 percent of the world’s land mass and more than a third of its population. However, geopolitical gaps have grown as the group has expanded further.
That is to not to take away from the very real advances in economic collaboration. A UN Trade and Development study released earlier this year highlights that intra-BRICS trade increased from around $84 billion in 2003 to almost $1.2 trillion in 2024, annual growth of about 13 percent. As of 2026, intra-BRICS trade accounts for about 20 percent of global south-south exchange, a significant jump.
However, geopolitical gaps are significant. This includes between original bloc members India and China, which have had tensions from time to time, particularly over border issues. India is also a member of the Quadrennial Security Dialogue group alongside the US, Australia, and Japan.
New Delhi and Beijing have had significant differences over the future strategic direction of BRICS+. India has consistently sought to focus the bloc away from geopolitics toward geoeconomics with an agenda that includes south-south economic and financial cooperation, plus reforms of international financial institutions to give developing countries greater voice and representation.
In September 2021, when India last chaired the group, leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration on the 15th anniversary of foundation of the bloc. This emphasized reform of the multilateral economic system, harnessing digital tools for achieving sustainable development goals, and enhancing people-to-people exchanges. 

The BRICS+ meeting of deputy foreign ministers and special envoys in April ended without a joint declaration.

Andrew Hammond

By contrast, China has tended to try to shift the forum toward supporting its broader geopolitical goals. This includes the massive Belt and Road infrastructure scheme, and the Global Development Initiative.
The two powers also have tensions over the degree to which the BRICS+ should embrace anti-US policies, including de-dollarization. China, alongside Russia, has pushed for faster development of alternative payment systems, plus a common BRICS currency or reserve asset.
When Russia last chaired the bloc in October 2024, the Kazan Declaration was adopted. This kick-started a feasibility study on other related initiatives, including a BRICS Clear depositary and securities trade settlement system and a common reinsurance company. Following increased Western sanctions since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow is helping Beijing lead the push to create alternative non-Western economic platforms with less reliance not only on the dollar, but also on other currencies such as the euro.
India has generally been more restrained. Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal said last year that “we have no plans,” and adding: “It is impossible to think of a BRICS currency.”
India-China disagreements have widened as the bloc has grown from the original small group to a core membership of 10. In addition, the bloc has handed partnership status to 10 more nations. Moreover, a wider array of countries has expressed an interest in collaborating with the BRICS+ forum.
The fast-growing heterogeneity of the club, with its many new members, will increase fears in some quarters of the world that the bloc could, ultimately, become an increasingly concerted, anti-Western alliance.
Given the growing geopolitical gaps in the bloc, India this year is pushing to double down on BRICS+ becoming an increasingly institutionalized forum for emerging market cooperation — this despite the diverging long-term economic trajectory of some nations, including the first five members. Today, China’s economic output is around 50 times that of South Africa, for instance.
However, the BRICS have an overall strong economic story to tell. In 1992, the share of global growth accounted for by G7 countries was about 45.5 percent, while that of the BRICS was about 16.7 percent. Yet by 2023, these figures were dramatically different at about 29.3 percent and 37.4 percent, respectively.
India is also aware that, in recent decades, over 40 percent of the growth in the global economy came from BRICS+ countries. Looking to the future, the average rate of economic growth in the bloc is expected to be higher than in the G7 economies.
Taken together, this highlights how India, as the 2026 chair, will use economic cooperation as a glue to hold the BRICS+ wall together. By refocusing on the group’s original economic potential, New Delhi will hope to reduce deepening geopolitical divisions among its members.

• Andrew Hammond is an associate at LSE IDEAS at the London School of Economics.