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The ongoing political activity of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, including his visits within just a few days to Ankara, London, Madrid and Athens, point to the way Riyadh is managing the Middle East crisis. This is being done by preventing the American-Iranian confrontation from sliding into an open regional war, safeguarding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz — since the return of safe maritime passage is an international interest, not merely a Gulf concern — and transforming influential capitals into an effective network of political pressure that supports de-escalation efforts and the negotiations being mediated by Pakistan.
At this stage, with the conflict characterized by political and security deadlock and stagnation, Saudi Arabia is operating according to an extremely delicate equation that blends dialogue and deterrence in a way that neither negates the other; rather, they complement one another. It is strengthening its defensive military capabilities and openly condemning any hostile Iranian behavior, while at the same time the Saudi foreign minister remains in contact with his Iranian counterpart. Meanwhile, Riyadh is coordinating with Islamabad to establish a clear and practical path for dialogue that prevents the resumption of military operations.
From this perspective, Saudi diplomacy appears less like traditional mediation, or mere moral and political support for Pakistan’s efforts, and more like meticulous risk management. Riyadh does not present itself as a neutral mediator between two equal threats; it is a state directly targeted by the repercussions of war, having been subjected to multiple attacks involving Iranian drones and ballistic missiles. It is also a central pillar of global energy security and a key party concerned with preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and stopping the Strait of Hormuz from becoming a tool of blackmail in Tehran’s hands. Based on all this, the Kingdom’s political discourse has been both measured and clear at the same time, while its security stance has remained firm in confronting any risks threatening Saudi territory.
Saudi diplomacy appears less like traditional mediation and more like meticulous risk management
Hassan Al-Mustafa
This strict balance has been evident in developments on the ground. To illustrate this, one can point to Saudi Arabia’s announcement that it intercepted three drones that entered its airspace from Iraqi territory on May 17, along with the Ministry of Defense’s confirmation that it had taken the necessary operational measures to protect sovereignty and security. This stance demonstrates that de-escalation efforts do not mean a lack of military readiness or leniency toward violations of Saudi sovereignty.
Riyadh has exercised “strategic patience” regarding the attacks carried out against it by Iran and its affiliated militias in Iraq. While it has militarily protected Saudi airspace and territory, it has also practiced restraint from a position of strength with the aim of reaching sustainable and workable solutions. In this context, one can understand why the Kingdom urged US President Donald Trump not to launch military strikes against Iran — something Trump himself referred to after a phone call with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan.
The Kingdom does not want war to return without there being a political horizon or achievable objectives. Military operations alone will not lead to security in the Arabian Gulf. There must be a clear political vision and a coordinated program of economic, diplomatic and legal pressure on Iran that compels it to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and abandon its hostile behavior toward neighboring states. This requires building a broad and effective network involving international and European efforts.
De-escalation efforts do not mean a lack of military readiness or leniency toward violations of Saudi sovereignty
Hassan Al-Mustafa
Within this context, Saudi-Spanish relations and the announcement of a strategic partnership between the two countries can be understood, especially since this relationship has a political, cultural and economic history that has accumulated through issues related to peace, energy, infrastructure, defense and transport. Spain’s name is also linked to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, which established the framework for Arab-Israeli negotiations after the Gulf War on the basis of “land for peace.” Saudi Arabia later advanced the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002, which has remained one of the most important Arab frameworks for a two-state solution.
Thus, it becomes clear to observers that Saudi Arabia is not managing the crisis through a single narrow channel but rather through multiple tracks. It communicates with Iran, coordinates with Washington, supports Islamabad’s mediation, opens European channels in London, Madrid and Athens, and maintains regional coordination with Ankara and Gulf capitals. It is seeking to build a political environment that reduces the likelihood of war returning and gives the negotiated solution regional and international backing, so that diplomacy is reinforced by strength.
“Riyadh has long been aware of the Iranian regime’s malicious intentions and has actively deterred its threats since 1979. This is why it would have welcomed any logical approach to neutralize these threats, while at the same recognizing that Iran will always be a neighbor, and the dangers of a miscalculated move would have dire consequences,” wrote Arab News Editor-in-Chief Faisal Abbas in his article titled “How to read the Saudi position.” This is why the Beijing Agreement was signed in 2023.
The Kingdom is currently working to build its military capabilities, confront Iranian threats both practically and diplomatically, and communicate with countries where Iran-affiliated militias operate in order to strongly urge them to prevent any attacks on Saudi territory. In other words, there is a multilevel management of the crisis aimed at achieving sustainable security in the Arabian Gulf because the continuation of political deadlock means the return of war at an even greater cost to everyone, without exception.
- Hassan Al-Mustafa is a Saudi writer and researcher specializing in Islamist movements, the evolution of religious discourse, and relations between the Gulf states and Iran.
X: @Halmustafa
